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JURISDICTION
Section 78-2a-3(2)(k) of the Utah Code gives this court
jurisdiction over this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue;

Did the trial court correctly conclude that,

under section 38-3-2 of the Utah Code, West One's perfected
security interest took priority over the plaintiff's lessor's lien?
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of
a statute and grant of summary judgment present questions of law,
which this court reviews for correctness.

See, e.g. , Ward v.

Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990); Bonham v. Morgan,
788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Interpretation of section 38-3-2 of the Utah Code is
determinative of the issue presented for review.

That section

states:
38-3-2.

Priority of lessor's lien.

The lien provided for in this chapter [i.e., a
lessor's lien] shall be preferred to all other
liens or claims except claims for taxes and
liens of mechanics under Chapter 1 of this
title, perfected security interests, and
claims of employees for wages which are
preferred by law; provided, that when a lessee
shall be adjudicated a bankrupt, or shall make
an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or
when his property shall be put into the
possession of a receiver, the lien herein
provided for shall be limited to the rent for
ninety days prior thereto.
- 1 -

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in
the Court Below
The plaintiff brought this action to foreclose its

lessor's lien against certain personal property of the defendant
lessees, Frederick Paul Ninow, Staci L. Ninow and R-West Systems,
Inc. See Record ("R.") at 2-7, 52-57 & 163-70, Defendant West One
filed an answer claiming a perfected security interest in the same
property.

R. at 114-17, 194-97.

The case involves the relative

priority of the plaintiff's and West One's claims to the property.
The parties stipulated that the property could be sold
and the proceeds placed in an escrow account pending the court's
ruling on the relative priority of the parties' competing claims.
R. at 342-45. The priority issue was decided by cross-motions for
summary judgment. R. at 244-95 & 299-316.-1 The trial court ruled
that West One's perfected security interest in the collateral had
priority

over

the

plaintiff's

lessor's

lien.

R.

at 351;

Transcript, June 10, 1991 (R. at 400), at 10-11. The court entered
its findings of fact and conclusions of law, granted West One's
motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's motion for
partial summary judgment.

R. at 352-62.

1

The plaintiff claims that the parties stipulated that the
plaintiff's lessor's lien was prior to West One's security
interest. Brief of Appellant at 7 (citing plaintiff's affidavit).
West One only stipulated that the plaintiff's lien attached before
West One's lien was perfected, not that it had priority over West
One's lien. See Transcript, June 10, 1991 (R. at 400), at 1.
- 2 -

The plaintiff appealed, but the appeal was summarily
dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction because no final order
had ever been entered resolving the plaintiff's claims against one
of the defendants, Commercial Factors.

See R. at 414, 42 0-21.

Following remittitur, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment
against Commercial Factors, R. at 444-4 6, the earlier summary
judgment was revised to make it a final order, R. at 442, and the
plaintiff appealed a second time, R. at 447-49.
B.

Statement of Facts
The WFPP Trust owned a commercial building in Salt Lake

City, Utah.

On July 2, 1988, the WFPP Trust, as lessor, entered

into a lease with defendants Frederick Paul Ninow, Staci L. Ninow
and R-West Systems, Inc., as lessees.

The lease was for a period

of five years and two months, beginning July 1, 1988, and ending
August 31, 1993.

R. at 172-82.

Before

August

4,

1988,

the

lessees

moved

certain

equipment onto the premises, including certain laminating equipment
that is at issue on this appeal.
UCC-1

financing

See R. at 327.

statements

covering

the

laminating

equipment and naming West One or its predecessors in interest as
the secured party were duly filed on August 4, 1988; November 8,
1988; February 3, 1989; February 9, 1989; and October 27, 1989.
See R. at 255-95.

- 3 -

The lessees failed to pay the rent due under the lease.
On January 24, 1990, the lessees abandoned the leased premises, and
the plaintiff repossessed them.

R. at 327.

On February 2, 1990, the plaintiff, as trustee of the
WFPP Trust,2 brought this action seeking, among other things, a
writ of attachment against the equipment located on the leased
premises. R. at 2-7. West One successfully defended the action on
the grounds that its perfected security interest in the laminating
equipment had priority over the plaintiff's lessor's lien under
section 38-3-2 of the Utah Code.

See R. at 194-235, 352-62.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah's statute governing lessors' liens says that such
liens are preferred to all other liens or claims except certain
enumerated claims, including "perfected security interests." Utah
Code Ann. § 38-3-2 (1988).

The plaintiff had a lessor's lien and

West One had a perfected security interest in the same property.
Under the plain language of the statute, West One's perfected
security interest had priority over the plaintiff's lessor's lien.
(Point I.A.)
None of the plaintiff's arguments justify a departure
from the plain language of the statute.

Utah case law does not

support the plaintiff's interpretation of the statute.
I.B.)

(Point

Neither does the history of lessors' liens or the common
2

For convenience, West One will refer
plaintiff and the WFPP Trust as the "plaintiff."
- 4 -

to

both

the

law.

(Point I.e.)

unavailing.

The plaintiff's policy arguments are similarly

In fact, public policy supports the trial court's

interpretation of the statute. (Point I.D.)
Recognizing the weakness of his statutory arguments, the
plaintiff now argues, for the first time on appeal, that the
statute does not apply.

The court should not reach the merits of

this argument, but even if the plaintiff were correct that the
statute does not apply (and there is no evidence of record to
support this assertion), the only basis for the plaintiff's claim
would be the common law, and there is no common law lessor's lien.
Thus, if the plaintiff were correct that the statute does not
a

PPlY/ the plaintiff would have no claim to the property or its

proceeds.

(Point II.)
ARGUMENT
I.

The Bank's Perfected Security Interest Is Superior to
the Plaintiff's Lessor's Lien.
A.

The Plain Language of Section 38-3-2 Gives the Bank's Interest
Priority.
A landlord had no lien against the property of his tenant

at common law.

See, e.g. . United Cigar Stores Co. of Am. v.

Florence Shop. 17 P.2d 871, 873 (Wash. 1933).3
3

Thus, absent a

Some jurisdictions recognized a common law remedy of
distress for rent in arrears, under which the landlord could seize
any removable personal property found on the leased premises. "The
right to distrain is not a strict lien, but rather is a peculiar
right which is in the nature of a lien, until the goods are
actually distrained under a landlord's warrant." 49 Am. Jur. 2d
- 5 -

contract or statute granting such a lien, a landlord has no lien
against the property of his tenant as security for rent.4 The
lease in this case did not provide for a landlord's lien, R. at
172-82, so the only basis for the plaintiff's claim to the
laminating equipment or the proceeds from its sale is the Utah
statute governing lessors' liens—title 38, chapter 3 of the Utah
Code.
Section 38-3-1 of the Utah Code provides for a limited
lessor's lien: "Except as hereinafter provided, lessors shall have
a lien for rent due upon all nonexempt property of the lessee
brought or kept upon the leased premises so long as the lessee
shall occupy said premises and for thirty days thereafter."

Utah

Landlord and Tenant § 726 at 675 (1970). In many jurisdictions,
the remedy has been expressly abolished by statute, and in others
it is deemed impliedly abolished by statutes governing the general
remedies for recovery of rent. Id. A few jurisdictions never
recognized the remedy. Icl. It is not clear whether Utah ever
recognized the remedy or whether enactment of Utah's lessors' lien
statute impliedly abolished the remedy. In any event, absent a
consensual lien, compliance with Utah's lessors' lien statute is
now the only way a landlord can seize a tenant's property.
Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah 1985) (absent
compliance with the statute, seizing a tenant's property is
actionable as a tort); Fudge v. Downing, 83 Utah 101, 27 P.2d 33,
37 (1933) (tenant could recover the value of personal property
taken where the landlord failed to show that it acquired any lien
on the personal property by statute or agreement).
The plaintiff
does not claim he has any interest in the property other than a
lessor's lien.
4

The plaintiff conceded as much in the brief he filed on
his first appeal. See Brief of Appellant at 12, Webb v. Ninow,
(Utah) (No. 910318) (Utah Ct. App. No. 92052-CA) ("A landlord by
virtue of his position has no lien upon any property of his tenant
as security for rent, in the absence of contract or statute").
- 6 -

Code Ann. § 38-3-1 (1988).

See also Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldq.,

N.V. , 663 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1983).

A lessor can preserve his

statutory lien by seeking a writ of attachment within thirty days
after the lessee abandons the premises, in compliance with sections
38-3-3 through -6. See Citizens Bank, 663 P.2d at 58.
The

same

chapter

that

creates

lessors' liens also

establishes their priority: "The lien provided for in this chapter
shall be preferred to all other liens or claims except claims for
taxes and liens of mechanics under Chapter 1 of this title,
perfected security interests, and claims of employees for wages
which are preferred by law . . . ."
(emphasis added).

See also

Utah Code Ann. § 38-3-2

Gray v. Kappos, 90 Utah 300, 61 P.2d

613, 615 (1936) (a lessor's lien is subordinate to the liens
specified in the statute).
It is undisputed that the plaintiff had a lessor's lien
against the lessees' equipment under section 38-3-1.

It is also

undisputed that the plaintiff preserved his lessor's lien by
seeking a writ of attachment within thirty days after the lessees
abandoned the premises.

But it is also undisputed that West One

had a perfected security interest in the equipment as of August 4,
1988, well before the plaintiff ever sought to foreclose his
lessor's lien. Under the plain language of the statute, West One's
perfected security interest takes priority over the plaintiff's
lessor's lien.

- 7 -

The plaintiff argues, however, that, where a lessor
properly preserves his lien by seeking a writ of attachment within
the thirty-day period, the lien relates back to the start of the
lease or, at the latest, to when the collateral was brought onto
the premises and that the lessor's lien takes priority over
security interests that were perfected after that date.

Because

the plaintiff preserved his lessor's lien by obtaining a writ of
attachment within thirty days after the lessees quit the premises,
he claims that his lien is superior to the bank's security
interest, which was not perfected until after the plaintiff's
lessor's lien attached.
The only problem with the plaintiff's argument is that it
is not what the statute says.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that, in
interpreting a statute, the court must first look to the statute's
plain language and must give effect to every part of the statute.
See, e.g.. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447
U.S. 102, 108 (1980); Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc.. 814 P.2d
1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Totorica v. Thomas. 16 Utah 2d 175, 397
P.2d

984, 987

(1965);

2A N. Singer, Statutes and

Construction § 46.06 (Sands 4th ed. 1984).

Statutory

If the language of the

statute is plain and unambiguous, it must be given effect.
e.g. . Caminetti v. United States. 242 U.S. 470, 485

See.

(1917);

Brinkerhoff v. Forsvth. 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); N. Singer,
supra. § 46.04.

Exceptions not made in the statute generally
- 8 -

cannot be read into it.

See, e.g., Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co.,

446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980).
The

language

of

the

statute

here

is

clear

and

unambiguous. It gives lessors' liens priority over all other liens
and claims "except" certain enumerated claims, including "perfected
security interests."

Utah Code Ann. § 38-3-2.

It does not say

that the security interest must have been perfected before the
lessor's lien attached.

If that is what the legislature intended,

it certainly could have said so, but it did not.
7-9-310(2)

(giving

a

landlord's

lien priority

Cf. Ala. Code §
over

security

interests that attach after the property is brought onto the
premises).
The plaintiff would have the court rewrite the statute to
read: "The lien provided for in this chapter shall be preferred to
all other liens except . . . security interests perfected before
the landlord's lien attaches . . . ."

It is not the function of

the court to rewrite or amend statutes, however.

The court must

apply the statute as it is written, and, under the plain language
of the statute, West One's perfected security interest is preferred
over the plaintiff's lien.

The plaintiff's argument that a

lessor's lien should be preferred to later perfected security
interests is best addressed to the legislature.
The plaintiff now suggests, for the first time on this
appeal, that his lessor's lien is itself a "perfected security
interest" within the meaning of the statute and that the priority
- 9 -

among the plaintiff's interest and West One's should therefore be
determined solely on the basis of when each arose.

See Brief of

Appellant at 12. The plaintiff never made that argument below or
in his original brief on appeal and cites no authority for his
argument.5

The court should therefore not even consider the

argument.

See, e.g. . Katz v. Pierce. 732 P. 2d 92, 95-96 (Utah

1986); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); Richins
v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co. , 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah Ct. App.
1991); English v. Standard Optical Co.. 814 P.2d 613, 618-19 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).
The argument lacks merit in any event. The statute gives
"perfected security interests" priority over lessors' liens.

It

would be tautologous to suggest that the term "perfected security
interests" includes lessors' liens.

If that were the case, then

the statute would mean that lessors' liens have priority over
lessors' liens.

If the

legislature had

intended

"perfected

security interests" to include lessors' liens, either it would not

5

The cases generally distinguish between statutory
lessors' liens and security interests, the perfection of which is
governed by article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g.,
Darden v. Ogle. 310 So.2d 182, 184-85 (Ala. 1975); Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp. v. Congressional Motors. Inc.. 228 A.2d 463, 469-70
(Md. 1967).
See generally Annotation, Secured Transactions:
Priority as Between Statutory Landlord's Lien and Security Interest
Perfected in Accordance with Uniform Commercial Code. 99 A.L.R.3d
1006 (1980). Compare Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-102(1) (1990) (article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code is generally meant to apply to any
transaction, regardless of form, that is meant to create a security
interest in personal property or fixtures), with id. § 70A-9-104(b)
(article 9 does not apply to a landlord's lien).
- 10 -

have subordinated lessors' liens to perfected security interests in
the first place, or it would have referred to "other perfected
security interests" or to "perfected security interests other than
lessors' liens," and not simply to "perfected security interests,"
without limitation.
Even if the plaintiff's lessor's lien were considered a
"security interest," the trial court's ruling was still correct
because the plaintiff's lien was not perfected until after West
One's security

interest.

A

lessor's statutory

lien

is not

perfected until the lessor files a complaint and has a writ of
attachment executed.

Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldg., N.V.. 663 P.2d

56, 58 (Utah 1983).

It is undisputed that West One's security

interest

was

perfected

before

the plaintiff

complaint or sought a writ of attachment.
plaintiff's

proposed

first-in-time

rule, West

ever

filed

his

Thus, under the
One's

security

interest would have priority over the plaintiff's lessor's lien
even if that lien were considered a "perfected security interest."
Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-312(5)(a) (1990) (conflicting security
interests in the same collateral rank according to priority in time
of filing or perfection).

West One's perfected security interest

therefore has priority over the plaintiff's lessor's lien, even if
that lien were properly considered a "perfected security interest."
B*

Utah Case Law Does Not Alter the Conclusion That the Bank's
Interest Has Priority over the Plaintiff's Lessor's Lien.

- 11 -

Despite the plain language of the statute, the plaintiff
suggests that Citizens Bank v. Elks Building, N.V., 663 P. 2d 56
(Utah 1983), requires the court to recognize exceptions to the
strict priority established by the statute.6

The landlord in

Citizens Bank did not perfect its lessor's lien by filing an action
for a writ of attachment within the thirty days provided for by the
statute.

The court, in dicta, stated that, if the lessor had

timely sought a writ of attachment and executed on it, "its
statutory lien would have been perfected, and it would have been
prior to the Bank's security interest."

663 P. 2d at 58.

This

statement can only properly be understood in light of the facts in
that case.
The lease in that case ran from August 15, 1980, to
February 14, 1981. The lessee failed to pay its rent in November
1980, and on December 15, 1980, it closed its business, leaving
certain equipment on the premises. Thereafter, in March 1981, the
b

The plaintiff claims that the trial court did not
consider the Citizens Bank case, suggesting that, if it had, its
decision may have been different. In fact, the trial court judge
stated that she had reviewed the pleadings and the cases that the
parties had cited, "particularly the Utah cases." Transcript, June
10, 1991 (R. at 400), at 10 (a copy of which is included in the
addendum to the Brief of Appellant). The plaintiff cited Citizens
Bank in his memorandum in support of his motion for partial summary
judgment. R. at 307. Thus, the trial court apparently considered
the case. Counsel for the plaintiff may not have argued the case
at the hearing on his motion, but that does not mean that the trial
court did not consider it. If in fact the trial court did not
consider the case, as the plaintiff claims, it was only because the
plaintiff did not sufficiently bring it to the court's attention.
The plaintiff cannot therefore claim that the trial court erred by
not considering the case.
12 -

lessee applied for a loan from Citizens Bank.

The loan was

approved and disbursed on April 7, 1981, and the bank filed a
financing statement on the same day to perfect a security interest
in the lessee's equipment, including the equipment left on the
leased premises.

Two days later, the landlord filed a complaint

against the lessee for unpaid lease payments, in which the landlord
asserted a lessor's lien against the equipment.

The trial court

ruled that the bank's security interest had priority over the
lessor's lien. The lessor appealed, contending that it had both a
statutory lien and a contractual lien on the equipment and that
both were prior to the bank's security interest.

Id. at 57-58.

On appeal, the court first considered the validity of the
lessor's claimed liens.

Because it found that the lessor did not

have a valid lien, it did not reach the question of priorities.
Id. at 58. In fact, the court's opinion does not even mention the
priority statute—Utah Code Ann. § 38-3-2.

Instead, the court

first looked at section 38-3-1, which grants the lessor a lien but
only for a limited period: "[B]y the express terms of the statute,
the lessor's statutory lien terminates thirty-one days after the
lessee has quit the premises."

663 P.2d at 58.

Thus, the court

concluded, the lessor's "statutory landlord's lien expired January
16, 1981, and, barring a contractual lien, [the landlord] stood as
an unsecured creditor after that date."
7

Id.7

The court noted

The court also rejected the landlord's claim that it had
a contractual lien on the property.
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that a landlord can preserve his statutory lien by bringing an
action within thirty days. Id. (citing Eason v. Wheelock, 101 Utah
162, 120 P.2d 319 (1941)).

The court then stated that, if the

landlord had "file[d] a complaint against the lessee, request[ed]
a writ of attachment, and execute[d] on the writ," "its statutory
lien would have been perfected, and it would have been prior to the
Bank's security interest." Id. (emphasis added). That is because,
if the landlord had acted within the time required by the statute
(that is, by January 16, 1981), it would have attached and executed
on the property before the bank ever took its security interest.
The bank did not have any interest in the property before April 7,
1981, and the lessor's claim could have been fully satisfied by
that time.
The court did not say that, had the lessor acted timely,
its lien would have been superior to or would have had priority
over the bank's perfected security interest.

Rather, the court

said that the lessor's lien simply "would have been prior tof" that
is, earlier in time than, the bank's security interest.

See id.

(emphasis added). In other words, the lessor would have had a lien
before the bank did and could have foreclosed on its interest
before the bank's interest ever arose.

Thus, Citizens Bank

does

not justify an interpretation of the priority statute contrary to
its plain language.
The plaintiff also argues that Gray v. Kappos, 90 Utah
300, 61 P.2d 613 (1936), stands for the rule that first in time
- 14 -

prevails.

In fact, that case merely held that a purchase money

mortgage given before a lease was entered into was superior to a
lessor's lien, a proposition neither side disputes. Nevertheless,
the case merits some discussion.
In 1928 a bank loaned the Kapposes money to buy sheep and
took a note and mortgage in return.

In January 192 9 the Kapposes

leased land from the plaintiff on which to graze their sheep. The
bank subsequently loaned the Kapposes more money to buy more sheep.
The Kapposes gave the bank new notes and mortgages, which the
parties apparently intended as renewals of the prior notes and
mortgages.

After the sheep were sold, the plaintiff brought an

action, claiming that his lessor's lien took priority over the
interests of the bank and of the purchaser of the sheep.
The court first quoted the priority statute in effect at
the time, which was identical to current section 38-3-2 except that
it

referred

to

"mortgages

for

"perfected security interests."

purchase

money11

rather

than

See 61 P.2d at 614-15 (quoting

Rev. Stat. Utah § 52-3-2 (1933); Comp. Laws Utah § 3777 (1917)).
The court stated categorically:

"Under this statute, if the

mortgage foreclosed by the bank was for the purchase money for the
sheep in question, then it has priority over the lien claimed by
plaintiff."

Id. at 615.

The court concluded that the initial

mortgage and its subsequent renewals were purchase money mortgages
and thus had priority.
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The lessor in Kappos next claimed that his lien should at
least have priority over the mortgages on sheep bought after
January 1929, since the sheep were brought onto the leased property
before the mortgages were ever filed of record. The court rejected
the argument.

It reemphasized that the plaintiff's lien, "based

entirely on the statute," was "subordinate to a purchase-money
mortgage."

Id. The court recognized that the failure to record a

purchase money mortgage could estop the mortgagee from claiming
benefits under the mortgage, but the plaintiff had not claimed that
the bank was estopped.

The court concluded, "The transactions

being bona fide, and there being no fraud or estoppel claimed, the
plaintiff's lien is subject to the purchase-money mortgage," as the
statute provided.
C.

Id.8

Neither History nor the Common Law Can Change the Plain
Meaning of the Statute.

8

In dicta, the court also reasoned that the lessor could
not obtain any greater rights in the sheep than the Kapposes had
when the sheep were brought onto the property, and since the sheep
were already subject to the bank's purchase-money mortgage, the
lessor's lien "was likewise subject to that same mortgage." 61
P.2d at 615. In other words, because the bank was first in time,
the lessor's lien attached only to the already encumbered sheep.
The court's reasoning on this point seems faulty. See, e.g., id.
at 616 (Wolfe, J. , concurring).
Under that reasoning, a lessor
could never have priority over a prior claim, yet the statute gives
lessors priority over all claims except those specifically
enumerated.
But even if the court were right that the bank's
purchase money mortgage had priority because it was also first in
time, that does not mean that the statute only gives a purchase
money mortgage (or, as in this case, a perfected security interest)
priority where it is first in time. The statute contains no such
limitation.
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The plaintiff

argues that the principles

governing

priorities in common law distress actions should apply to statutory
lessors' liens and give lessors' liens priority over competing
security interests that are perfected after the lease commences and
the collateral comes onto the premises. The argument is irrelevant
since, whatever the situation may have been at common law or in
other jurisdictions, the priority of the parties' claims in this
case is governed by the statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-3-2, and the
statute gives perfected security interests priority over lessors'
liens, regardless of when the security interest was perfected.9
The plaintiff has not shown that any of the cases he has cited from
other jurisdictions applied a statute identical to Utah's to reach
the result the plaintiff argues for, and, in fact, to the extent
those cases were decided on the basis of statutory interpretation,
they apparently did not involve priority statutes like Utah's.
See, e.g., Howard v. Calhoun, 21 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1945) (construing
a statute giving a lessor a lien from the time property is brought
onto the premises in light of the state constitutional homestead
exemption).
If Utah's priority statute were meant simply to codify
the general rule of priority (namely, that the first to attach has
priority) , there would have been no need for the statute, since

9

Moreover, the plaintiff has not even shown that Utah ever
recognized a common law right on the part of a lessor to distrain
his tenant's property. See supra note 3.
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that would have been the result if the statute were silent as to
priorities.

Moreover, that is not what the statute says.

The

statute could have established priorities based on when a lien or
other claim attached or was perfected. Cf. Ala. Code § 7-9-310(2)
(establishing priorities between a landlord's lien and a security
interest in collateral based on when the security interest attached
in relation to the collateral being brought onto the premises).
But it does not.

It says that lessors' liens "shall be preferred

to all other liens or claims," without regard for when they arose
or when they were perfected, with certain exceptions, including
"perfected security interests."
perfected

security

Utah Code Ann. § 38-3-2.

interests had to be perfected

If

before the

lessor's lien attached to have priority over the lessor's lien, the
same would have to be true of the other exceptions, also.

The

plaintiff does not claim that the other exceptions (i.e., tax
liens, mechanic's liens and claims of employees for wages) must
have attached or been perfected before the lessor's lien to have
priority, and there is simply no evidence that the legislature
intended to impose any priority requirement on any of the excepted
liens.
D.

The Statute and the Trial Court's Ruling Are Supported by
Sound Policy Considerations.
Important policy considerations support the conclusion

that perfected security interests have priority over lessors'
liens, regardless of when they were perfected.
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In fact, a cursory

reading of the statute indicates that all the exceptions to the
priority of lessors' liens (namely, tax liens, mechanics' liens,
and preferred claims of employees for wages, as well as perfected
security interests) represent policy choices by the legislature,
that is, choices to prefer certain types of claimants to landlords
when it comes to distributing a defaulting lessee's personal
property, just as the legislature's initial choice to prefer
lessor's liens over other liens (even when those liens were first
in time) was based on policy considerations.

The preference for

lessors' liens encourages landlords to rent their property by
giving them some assurance that they will get paid. The exception
for perfected security interests, on the other hand, benefits both
lessees and lessors by making it easier for lessees to borrow
money, which may be essential to their ability to make money and
thus pay their rent.

It also encourages lenders to lend money,

knowing that they will be secure even if the borrower later
defaults on a lease obligation.

If lessors had priority over all

subsequently perfected security interests, commerce would be very
difficult since lenders would be unwilling to lend money if they
could not be assured, despite UCC searches, that their security
interests would mean anything in the event of default. Even if the
tenant were current in his rent at the time the lender perfected
his security interest, a subsequent failure to pay rent could make
the lender's perfected security interest worthless. Lenders could
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not protect themselves and would not be willing to take that
risk.10

Thus, the Utah Legislature had a rational basis for

subordinating

lessors' liens to perfected

security interests.

There may be other policy considerations favoring lessors, but the
court "can only presume that the legislature weighed the competing
considerations when it enacted [the statute] and can only suggest
that complaints against inherent unfairness in the statutory scheme
should be addressed to that body."

Freund v. Utah Power & Light

Co., 793 P.2d 362, 369 (Utah 1990).
The

plaintiff

suggests

that,

even

if the

original

priority statute represented a policy choice preferring lenders to
landlords in certain situations (namely, in the case of purchase
money mortgages), the 1977 amendment to the statute, which replaced
the phrase "mortgages for purchase money" with "perfected security
interests," was simply meant to bring the statute's terminology
into line with the Uniform Commercial Code, which introduced the
term "security interest" and did away with other types of liens,
such as chattel mortgages, hypothecations, pledges, conditional
sales, and the like, and was not meant to expand the scope of
security interests that would take priority over lessors' liens.

10

The plaintiff suggests that a lender could protect itself
by obtaining a landlord subordination agreement.
Brief of
Appellant at 9 n.12. But that presupposes a landlord willing to
sign such an agreement, and not all landlords may be willing. The
legislature could reasonably conclude that lenders should not have
to bear the risk that a landlord may be unwilling to subordinate
his lien voluntarily.
- 20 -

Brief of Appellant at 9 n.ll. The plaintiff cites no legislative
history to support this argument, and it is not supported by the
statutory language.

If that were the legislature's intent, the

legislature certainly could have said so.

It could have simply

replaced the term "mortgages" with "perfected security interests,"
without deleting the phrase "purchase money," or it could have
replaced the whole phrase ("mortgages for purchase money") with the
term "purchase money security interest," which is a defined term
under the UCC.

See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-107 (1990).21

Where,

as here, the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the court
will

not look

beyond

the language

to divine

some

contrary

legislative intent but can assume that the language the legislature
chose accurately expresses its intent.

See, e.g., Escondido Mut.

Water Co. v. LaJolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 772
(1984); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 425 U.S. 185, 199-201 (1976);
Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah
1988). The legislature chose to make lessors' liens subordinate to
all "perfected security interest[s]," not just perfected purchase
money security interests.
The plaintiff also suggests that, if the statute is given
its plain meaning, a landlord could be deprived of his lien through
11

The UCC treats purchase money security interests
different from other security interests for some purposes. See,
e.g. . Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-9-301, -302, -312 & -313. If the
legislature had intended to give only purchase money security
interests priority over lessors' liens, it certainly knew how to
make the distinction.
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"sham

transactions":

"A

lessee could

borrow money, give a

perfected security interest, and defeat a landlord lien." Brief of
Appellant at 11.

The plaintiff does not explain how such a

transaction would be a "sham" if the lessee received consideration
for the security interest he gave the lender, especially if he was
current on his rent at the time, and the plaintiff concedes that
there are remedies for sham or fraudulent transactions under the
Uniform Commercial Code.

Id.

See also Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-1

through -13 (1989 & Supp. 1991) (Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act) .
II.
Section 38-3-8 Does Not Alter the Priorities
of the Parties' Respective Claims.
Lastly, the plaintiff argues that chapter 3 of title 38,
governing lessors' liens, does not apply in this case and that,
under the common law, the plaintiff's lien has priority over the
subsequent lien of the bank.
The plaintiff raises this argument for the first time on
appeal.12

Appellate courts will generally not even consider

arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v.
Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 34 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814

12

In fact, the plaintiff's position on this point is just
the opposite of his position in the trial court. In the trial
court, the plaintiff claimed, in his complaint, amended complaint
and second amended complaint, that chapter 3 of title 38 did apply
and that it gave the plaintiff a lessor's lien against the
property. See R. at 4-5, 54-55 & 166-67.
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(1989); Olson v. Park-Craicr-Olson, Inc.. 815 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).
Moreover, section 38-3-8, the statute the plaintiff
relies on for this argument, does not even apply under the facts of
this case.

That statute says:

"This chapter shall not be

applicable to a written lease for a term of years in which, as part
of the consideration thereof, the lessee or assigns shall erect a
building or improvements upon the leased premises." Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-3-8 (emphasis added).13

All of the improvements required in

the lease, on which the plaintiff relies, were to be completed by
the lessor:

"Lessor shall furnish and install concrete floor

. . . ," R. at 180 § XVIII f 1 (emphasis added); "Lessor shall
furnish and install commercial grade carpet and base . . . ," id.
5 2 (emphasis added).

The only obligation the lessee had was to

pay half the cost to enlarge an existing door.

Id. J 3. At best,

the lessee only promised to help pay for an improvement. A promise
to pay money is not the same as a promise to make improvements,
and, under the statute, it is only the lessee's erection of the
improvement, not even his promise to make it, that removes a case
from the scope of chapter 3. In fact, there is no evidence in the
record that the improvements the lessor agreed to make were ever

13

The apparent rationale for section 38-3-8 is that, where
the lessee has made valuable improvements on the leased premises,
the lessor receives the benefit of the improvements and therefore
has less need for a lien on the lessee's personal property.
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made.

Thus, there is no basis for concluding that section 38-3-8

even applies.
But even assuming it does, the plaintiff has not thought
through the consequences of his argument. He claims that, because
chapter 3 does not apply, the common law does, and under the common
law rule of priorities, his lien takes priority because it was the
first to attach.

The plaintiff forgets, though, that there is no

common law lessor's lien. The plaintiff can claim a lessor's lien
only because chapter 3 of title 38 creates such a lien. If chapter
3 does not apply, as the plaintiff belatedly argues, then the
plaintiff does not have any lien to take priority over West One's
perfected security interest.14 Thus, section 38-3-8 does not help
the plaintiff, even if it did apply.
CONCLUSION
The statute establishing the priority of lessors' liens
means what it says. A lessor's lien does not take priority over a
perfected security interest.

The trial court correctly concluded

14

The plaintiff cites West One's argument in the trial
court for the proposition that, if the statute does not apply, the
common law does and that under the common law the first to attach
prevails. Brief of Appellant at 15 n.14. Counsel for West One was
simply referring to the issue of priorities. If the act creating
lessors' liens did not establish any priorities, then the court
could fill in the gap in the statute by applying the common law
rule applicable to liens generally, namely, the first in time
prevails. West One did not argue that, if there were no lessors'
liens statute at all, the plaintiff would still have a lien on his
tenants' property. See Transcript, June 10, 1991 (R. at 400), at
3-4.
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that West One's perfected security interest had priority over the
plaintiff's lessor's lien. The judgment of the trial court should
therefore be affirmed.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM F. WEBB, Trustee of
WFPP TRUST,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

]
1
)

FREDERICK PAUL NINOW; STACI L. ]
NINOW; R-WEST, INC. , a corpora- ]
tion, WEST ONE BANK, UTAH, a
corporation; HOMER CUTRUBUS,
NED F. PARSON; JIM HART; and
J
COMMERCIAL FACTORS OF SALT LAKE ;
CITY, LTD., a limited partner- i
chip,
i
Defendants.
]

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 900900672-PR
Hon. Anne M. Stirba

This matter came before the Court, Honorable Anne M.
Stirba presiding, on June 10, 1991, for hearing on cross-motions
for summary judgment filed by defendant West One Bank,

Utah and

0035;

plaintiff, William F. Webb. Defendant West One Bank was represented
by Francis J. Carney, Esq.; plaintiff Webb by Robert F. Orton,
Esq.

The material facts were undisputed and, therefore, the Court

makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendant, R-West, Inc. is a Utah corporation and

is also known as R-West Systems, Inc.
2.

On July 2, 1988, William F. Webb, as trustee of

the WFPP Trust ("Webb"), as lessor, entered into a written lease
agreement with defendants Frederick Ninow, Staci Ninow and R-West
Systems, Inc. ("R-West"), as lessees, for the lease of certain
commercial premises located at 2560 West Directors Row, Salt Lake
City, Utah.

The term of the lease was from July 1, 1988 to August

31, 1993.
3.

On August 4, 1988, a UCC-1 Financing Statement was

duly filed by Mr. Homer Cutrubus, Mr. Ned Parsons, and Mr. Jim
Hart, as secured parties, as to personal property collateral consisting of certain foam lamination equipment and related material,
all owned by R-West, Inc. (the "Collateral").
4.

The Collateral was brought onto the leased premise

Bometime after July 2, 1988 and before August 4, 1988, by R-West,
Inc.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law - 2
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5.

The Collateral remained on the leased premises con-

tinuously from before August 4, 1988, until after the commencement
of this action in February 1990.
6.

On November 8, 1988, a second UCC-1 Financing State-

ment on the Collateral was filed in favor of Continental Bank &
Trust Company (the former name of West One Bank, Utah).
7.

A third UCC-1 Financing Statement in favor of Con-

tinental Bank & Trust Company on the Collateral was filed on February 3, 1989.
8.

A fourth UCC-1 Financing Statement in favor of Con-

tinental Bank & Trust Company on the Collateral was filed as a
fixture filing with the Salt Lake County Clerk' s Office on February
9, 1989.
9.

A fifth UCC-1 Financing Statement on the Collateral

in favor of Homer Cutrubus, Ned Parsons and Jim Hart was filed
on July 5, 1989.
10.

A sixth and final UCC-1 Financing Statement in favor

of Commercial Factors of Salt Lake City, Ltd. was filed on the
Collateral on October 27, 1989,
11.

On July 27, 1990/ the August 4, 1988 Security Agree-

ment of Homer Cutrubus, Ned Parsons, and Jim Hart on the Collateral
was assigned to West One Bank, Utah and West One Bank has acceded
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to

all

rights

of

Messrs.

Cutrubus,

Parsons

and

Hart

in

the

Collateral.
12.

Defendant R-West breached the terms of its Lease

Agreement with plaintiff and at the time of the commencement of
this action there was due and owing the sum of $93, 850. 02 over
and above all set-offs and counterclaims.
13.

The premises were abandoned by defendant R-West,

Inc. on January 24, 1990/ after having been continuously occupied
since the commencement of the lease, and plaintiff retook possession
on that date.
14.

On February 9, 1990, plaintiff obtained a writ of

attachment as against the Collateral and duly executed same.
15.

By stipulation of plaintiff Webb and defendant West

One Bank the Collateral was sold for the sum of $150,000 which
amount has been placed into an interest-bearing account with West
One Bank.

The parties have stipulated that the Court may determine

priority in the cash proceeds in the same manner as priority in
the Collateral itself would have been determined had it not been
sold.
DISCDSSTOK

West One Bank has moved for summary judgment adjudging
the relative priorities of the parties in the Collateral in accordance with § 38-3-5, Utah Code Ann. (1977).

Plaintiff Webb has filed

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law - 4
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a cross-motion for summary judgment adjudging and decreeing that
his lessor' s lien has priority over all other liens in the
Collateral, including the bank's.

West One Bank and Mr. Webb, by

their respective counsel, have filed memoranda which have been
reviewed by the Court.

No appearances have been made by or on

behalf of any other parties in this action.
Section 38-3-5 provides that upon the filing of a complaint for execution upon a lessor' s lien, it shall be the duty of
the court to, among other things, "make a determination of the
priorities of the claims, liens, and security interests in such
property. M

There are no material disputed facts and therefore

the priority issues can be decided by summary judgment under Rule
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It is undisputed that plaintiff
has a lessor's lien pursuant to § 38-3-1 in the Collateral.

It

is also undisputed that defendant West One Bank has duly-perfected
security interests in the Collateral dating from August 4, 1988.
Finally, it is undisputed that the Collateral was brought onto
the leased premises before the perfection of the security interest
by West One Bank' s predecessor-in-interest on August 4, 1988,
Section 38-3-2 provides that a lessor's lien "shall be
preferred to all other liens or claims except claims for taxes
and liens of mechanics under Chapter 1 of this title, perfected
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gecvrity uterestS/ and claims of employees for wages which are
preferred by law . . ,«

(emphasis added).

Plaintiff did not dis-

pute that a perfected security interest in the Collateral would
be prior to its lessor' s lien had that security interest been perfected before the Collateral was brought onto the leased premises.
The issue before the Court was whether a security interest in Collateral which was perfected after the Collateral had been brought
onto the leased premises, and thus became subject to a lessor's
lien, still had priority over the lessor' s lien under § 38-3-2.
The Court, having reviewed the pertinent statutes and the
memoranda submitted by counsel, having heard the arguments of counsel, and being otherwise advised in the premises, finds that the
statutory intent expressed in § 38-3-2 is to grant priority to
perfected security interests over lessor's liens, even if those
security interests are perfected after collateral is brought onto
the leased premises.

Therefore, the Court concludes as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Plaintiff Webb has a valid lessor' s lien pursuant

to § 38-3-1 which attached to the Collateral as of the date it
was brought onto the leased premises.
2.

Defendant West One Bank has duly-perfected security

interests in the Collateral which were first perfected on August
4, 1988.
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3.

Under § 38-3-2, Utah Code Ann. (1977) the perfected

security interests of West One Bank are prior to the lessor's lien
of plaintiff Webb.

.£*k

MADE AND ENTERED thi£/ T' VV day of June, 1991.
BY THE COURT:
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
Attorneys for Defendant
West One Bank, Utah

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM F. WEBB, Trustee of
WFPP TRUST,
Plaintiff,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
-vsFREDERICK PAUL NINOW; STACI L.
NINOW; R-WEST, INC., a corporation, WEST ONE BANK, UTAH, a
corporation; HOMER CUTRUBUS,
NED F. PARSON; JIM HART; and
COMMERCIAL FACTORS OF SALT LAKE
CITY, LTD., a limited partnership,

Civil No. 900900672-PR
Hon. Anne M. Stirba

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court, Honorable Anne M.
Stirba presiding, on June 10, 1991, for hearing on cross-motions
for summary judgment filed by defendant West One Bank,

Utah and

plaintiff, William F. Webb, as Trustee of WFPP Trust.

Defendant

West One Bank was represented by Francis J, Carney, Esq. ; plaintiff
Webb by Robert F. Orton, Esq.
The Court, having reviewed the memoranda submitted by
counsel, and having heard the arguments of counsel, having entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and being otherwise
advised in the premises, hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that defendant West One
Bank' s Motion for Summary Judgment shall be, and hereby is granted;
that plaintiff William F. Webb' s Motion for Summary Judgment shall
be, and hereby is, denied; that, accordingly, Summary Judgment is
entered in favor of West One Bank, Utah as against William F. Webb,
Trustee of WFPP Trust, decreeing that the perfected security interests of West One Bank, Utah are prior to and superior to the
lessor' s lien of plaintiff, William F. Webb, as Trustee of WFPP
Trust.

The parties shall bear their own costs and fees.
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